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Book Review
Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION. By Amy Gutmann.t Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1987. Pp. xii, 321. $19.95.t
Reviewed by Suzanna Sherry*
Amy Gutmann's DemocraticEducation might equally well be entitled Republican Education, for its central theme is how to produce true
republican citizens-citizens who possess both the ability and the motivation to participate in their deliberative political communities. That
such a republican education must take place in a democratic context,
however, imposes limits on how educational decisions are made and on
what may be taught. Gutmann carefully explores both. The resulting
"democratic theory of education" she proposes and examines is a small
masterpiece of political theory with implications far beyond the educational context.
The book's significance for legal and jurisprudential scholars lies
primarily in the development of principles of democratic republicanism.
Modem constitutional jurisprudence rests largely on an accommodation
of competing theories of the central meaning of our constitutional system; majoritarianism conflicts with individual rights, and the liberal focus on communities as aggregations of individuals conflicts with the
republican focus on individuals as members of communities. Constitutional scholars-of both the traditional and neorepublican schools-who
are attempting to reconcile the conflicting demands of majoritarianism,
individual rights, and common community aspirations would do well to
begin with some version of Gutmann's theories of democracy and education. The book also contains insights on such issues as antidiscrimination law and academic freedom that might be useful to public law
scholars. Putting DemocraticEducation on a recommended reading list
for almost everybody imposes no hardship: the book is as well written as
it is important.
t
t
*

Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
Hereinafter cited by page number only.
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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I.
A democratic theory of education is necessary, according to Gutmann, largely because our diversity makes consensus on educational policy impossible. But resolving educational differences by democratic
deliberation is not merely an inconvenient necessity, for it is also a democratic virtue: "The democratic virtue, too simply stated, is that we can
publicly debate educational problems in a way much more likely to increase our understanding of education and each other than if we were to
leave the management of schools [to experts]." 1 A democratic theory of
education thus provides a lesson in republican citizenship not only to the
children (and adults) whose schooling it guides, but also to the members
of the public who make decisions about educational policy.
Simply stated, Gutmann's democratic theory of education consists
of a basic principle, "democratic control," subject to two constraints.
The basic principle is that educational policy decisions should be reached
by popular political means even if the resulting decisions are in some
objective sense incorrect. Democratic societies may make mistakes, but
"democracy is valuable for far more than its capacity to achieve correct
outcomes. ' 2 Self-government is an end in itself and not merely an instrumental good. Gutmann thus rejects the notion of a directed democracy,
in which popular choices are subject to a general test of correctness.
Gutmann, however, also criticizes strong democracy, which places
no limits on popular choices. The ideal of democracy itself, she suggests,
requires some constraints on possible outcomes. These constraints are
necessary because the democratic ideal, as Gutmann describes it, is more
than majoritarianism; it is "a society whose adult members are, and continue to be, equipped by their education and authorized by political
structures to share in ruling."' 3 Thus any educational policy that deprives current or future citizens of their ability to participate in governmental processes is illegitimate, regardless of whether it is arrived at
democratically. A democratic society "must educate all educable chil' 4
dren to be capable of participating in collectively shaping their society.
Two types of substantive educational policies might deprive children
of their future ability to "participate intelligently as adults in the political
processes that shape their society."5 Policies that directly or indirectly
exclude some children rom acquiring an education adequate to the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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rights and duties of citizenship violate what Gutmann calls the principle
of "nondiscrimination." ' 6 Policies that stifle the development of children's critical faculties, and thus prevent them from participating as
adults in a deliberative democracy, violate the principle of "nonrepression. ' '7 Nondiscrimination and nonrepression constitute Gutmann's two
constraints on the basic principle of democratic decision making. "The
promise of the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination is just
this: to support a strong democracy without sanctioning majority tyranny or sacrificing self-government in the future."
Behind this simple promise lies a complex theory of democracy. In
Chapter one, Gutmann outlines her theory of democratic education,
which reveals her broader image of the democratic ideal. It is an elegant
and persuasive vision, in part because she rejects foundationalism 9 and
instead tries to combine the strengths and avoid the weaknesses of various other theories.
She relies primarily on three of the most commonly held theories of
education: the Platonic "family state," the Lockean "state of families,"
and the Millian "state of individuals." The family state is a polity in
which the government takes an omnipotent and omnicompetent parental
role, "teaching all educable children what the (sole) good life is for them
and ... inculcating in them a desire to pursue the good life above all
inferior ones." 10 The state of families gives parents complete control
over the education of their children, either for the consequentialist reason
that they are the best protectors of their children's future interests or for
the moral reason that they have a natural right to educate their children.1 1 The state of individuals denies that either the state or parents
should have control over education. Instead, education must be designed
to give all children an opportunity to choose their own good lives, while
educators remain neutral among competing conceptions of the good
life. 12
In her critique of these theories Gutmann provides the most valuable insights for scholars attempting to reconcile the demands of democracy with the ideals of republican virtue. She is also most successfully
pragmatic here, measuring each theory against the realities of the Ameri6. P. 45.
7. Pp. 44-45.

8. P. 97.
9. Foundationalism is the belief "that any defensible political theory must begin by discovering some unquestionable or self-evident starting point." P. 21.
10. P. 23.
11. See pp. 28-29.
12. P. 34.
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can social and political strcture. Finally, by identifying the strengths of
each theory, she is able to construct a composite democratic theory of
education. What Gutmann identifies, often persuasively, as strengths of
each theory are in fact aspects that are commonly criticized. Thus her
democratic theory represents an approach to education and to republican
democracy significantly different from that provided by the more common theories.
Gutmann criticizes the ideal of the family state, in which the government is the sole arbiter of the good life, not on the usual pluralist
ground that no single good life can be unerringly identified. She instead
argues that imposing even the one true good life on those who are not
persuaded of its wisdom violates democratic principles, stressing again
that democracy has a value of its own beyond the results it might produce. Moreover, as a practical matter, an existing society will have difficulty in selecting the good life: "The objectively good life, defined as the
life that is best for people who are rightly educated from birth, need not
be the good life, or even the closest approximation of the good life, for
people who have been wrongly educated." 13 The main strength of the
family state, however, is an aspect frequently criticized by liberal pluralists:14

education in the family state is intentionally not value-neutral, but

rather predisposes children to choose "the kind of character conducive to
democratic sovereignty."'1 5
Gutmann rejects the state of families both because some parents (racist parents, for example) "cannot be counted upon to equip their children with the intellectual skills necessary for rational deliberation" 16 and
because children "are members of both families and states." 17 As members of democratic states, children are entitled to state assurance of an
education that ultimately will enable them to participate as citizens. Beyond this minimal definition of the good life of a citizen, however, lie
many different visions of the good, and both the virtue and danger of the
state of families is that it allows parents to perpetuate their own particular visions. The state of families, like the family state, protects nonneutral education. It recognizes "the value of our desire to cultivate, and
allow communities to cultivate, only a select range of choice for children,
to prune and weed their desires and aspirations." '1 8 Cultivating only se13. P. 26.
14. See K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (1977); B. WILLIAMS, ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY (1985).

15. P. 41.
16. P. 29.
17. P. 30.

18. P. 35.
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lected values in children should encourage them, as adults, both to lead
"a worthy life" and to "sustain a flourishing society." 1 9 Despite this easy
reconciliation between an individual good life and a good society, some
tension obviously exists between the family state and the state of families.
Gutmann recognizes the tension and returns to it after reviewing one
final theory, the state of individuals.
The state of individuals is perhaps the most commonly held educational theory today. Such a state turns control of education over to professional educators to avoid the value-laden teaching of either parents or
the state. The ideal educational policy, for individualists, "is one that
maximizes future choice without prejudicing children towards any controversial conception of the good life." 20 One problem Gutmann identifies with the state of individuals is that opportunity for choice often
conflicts with neutrality. Using the example of Amish children, she suggests that "[c]hildren may grow to have a greater range of choice (and to
live more satisfying lives) if their education is biased by those values favored by their society." 2 1 Freedom of choice, moreover, is not the sole
end of education, because we as a society value other things that might
conflict with freedom: "We value, for example, the moral sensibility that
enables us to discriminate between good and bad lives, and the character
that inclines us to choose good rather than bad lives."'2 2 We also value
for children the "identification with and participation in the good of their
family and the politics of their society."' 23 The quintessentially liberal
state of individuals ignores these more republican and communitarian
goods. The strength of the individualist theory of education is that it
counters the identified weaknesses of the other two theories by avoiding
both antidemocratic values taught by parents and single-good values
taught by the state.
Having read this far, most readers should now be able to sketch the
outlines of Gutmann's defense of the democratic theory of education.
That her theory follows naturally from her critiques and yet does not
appear redundant or uninteresting is a tribute to her writing. A democratic state of education begins with the recognition that education must
prepare children to become democratic citizens. Democratic citizens
have two distinctive features. First, they are "partially constituted by
subcommunities (such as their family, their work, play, civic, and reli19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
P. 34.

Id.
P. 37.
P. 43.
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gious groups)." 24 Second, they are nevertheless free to choose ways of
life beyond those of the subcommunities, "because the larger community
has equipped them for deliberating and thereby participating in the democratic processes by which choice among good lives and the chance to
'2 5
pursue them are politically structured.
A democratic theory of education shares with the family state the
notion that education should predispose children to choose lives "that
are consistent with sharing the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in
a democratic society," 26 including "religious toleration and respect for
the dignity of persons." 2 7 Like the state of families, however, the democratic theory recognizes that particularized visions of the good life may
be passed on from parent :o child. Finally, a democratic theory of education, like an individualist theory of education, requires educational policies that "aid children in developing the capacity to understand and to
evaluate competing conceptions of the good life and the good society":
28
in other words, to develop the capacity to "deliberate critically.1
It is hard to disagree with Gutmann's general vision of what education should do in a democratic state-especially one with republican aspirations. The basic principle-democratic control-and its two
constraints-nonrepression and nondiscrimination-follow naturally
from her original amalgmn of the virtues of each theory. The web of
relationships among the different parts of her analysis is intricate and
elegant. Citizens cannot participate fully in shaping their political society if they have not learned to deliberate critically-a recognition derived
from the state of individuals and requiring the constraint of nonrepression. Nor can citizens participate fully if they lack an intimate understanding of the essential values of democracy in general-a recognition
derived from the family state and requiring the constraint of nondiscrimination. Nor can they participate fully if they lack a connection to their
own democratic communities in particular-a recognition derived from
the state of families and requiring democratic control.
The value of Gutmann's theoretical analysis inheres in more than its
particularized persuasiveness. She avoids sharp dichotomies and foundationalist axioms and uses all the pragmatist tools to pursue her goal of
24. P. 45.
25. Pp. 45-46.
26. P. 42.
27. P. 72.
28. P. 44. The notion of democratic citizens as citizens able to deliberate critically and rationally is, as Gutmann recognizes, reminiscent of John Dewey. See J. DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND
SocIETY (1900). She suggests, however, that Dewey's theory of education is insufficiently democratic and overly individualist because it imposes on communities an abstract notion of what "the
wisest and best parents" would want. P. 13.
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describing a democratic theory of education. She recognizes the value of
both individual rights and community membership, of freedom to choose
and the importance of making the right choice. In rejecting the liberal
dichotomy between neutrality and totalitarianism, she argues: "Give
children liberty or give them virtue. Neither alternative is acceptable:
we legitimately value education not just for the liberty but also for the
virtue that it bestows on children; and the virtue that we value includes
' 29
the ability to deliberate among competing conceptions of the good."
Were the book to consist only of Gutmann's presentation and defense of her theory of democratic education (most of which is found in
Chapter one and the beginning of Chapter four), it would be a significant
and almost flawless work. The rest of the book, which goes on to explore
the applications of the basic theory, is weaker and less interesting, but it
is still well worth the effort.
II.
Gutmann first uses her democratic theory of education to illuminate
30
the purposes of primary education-elementary through high school.
To become functioning citizens of a democracy, children must learn both
moral character and moral reasoning. Her justification for requiring
both is an excellent summary of the attributes of republican citizenship.
Citizens who participate in the deliberative processes of a republic must
be "morally serious people,"'3 1 so that they
can be trusted to defend and to respect laws that are not in their
self-interest, at the same time as they can be expected to oppose
laws that violate democratic principles, and ultimately to disobey
them, if necessary, with the intent32of changing them by appealing
to the conscience of the majority.
Republican citizens must be both willing and able to deliberate about
moral questions in order to be distinguishable from "both sophists, who
use clever argument to elevate their own interests into self-righteous
causes, and traditionalists, who invoke established authority to
subordinate their own reason to unjust causes."' 33 According to Gutmann, moral character-a willingness to deliberate about moral questions-is best taught by example,3 4 and moral reasoning-the ability to
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

P. 36.
See p. 49 & n.6.
P. 52.
Id.
Id.
See p. 57.
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deliberate-is best taught didactically. 35 Consequently, schools should
use both methods.
Gutmann then turns to the major project of the book: using a democratic theory of education to formulate educational policy. In undertaking this project, Gutmann and her democratic theory of education
must answer two questions: "[W]ho should have authority to make decisions about education, and ...what [are] the moral boundaries of that
authority...-?36
Gutmann concludes in Chapter three that control over education
should be divided among the federal government, state and local governments, and professional educators within the schools. Leaving control
solely in the federal government would bureaucratize the schools,
"eliminat[ing] any effective democratic control." 37 Allowing state or local governments to control schools entirely "would reduce the United
States to a collection of democratic city-states, totally neglecting our collective interest in ... education." 38 Accordingly, Congress should set
minimum educational standards and require both "those [subjects] that
are essential to the justice of any democratic society and those that serve
to unite and distinguish us from other democratic societies."' 39 State and
local governments would be free to implement and supplement those
minimums. Finally, professional educators would be responsible for upholding the principle of nonrepression, preventing majorities from simply
perpetuating their own beliefs in the curriculum. 4°
In reaching and defending this scheme, Gutmann engages in a mode
of analysis that typifies the remainder of the book and that illustrates
both her strengths and weaknesses. Her practical application is sometimes superficial and uninformed by necessary technical expertise. In
canvassing the reasons that teachers cannot currently ensure the
nonrepressive character of education, for example, she lists factors that
virtually any observer would notice: low pay and low status, little
teacher control over what goes on in the classroom, entrenched unions
with interests other than good education, and a tenure and seniority system that provides no incentives. 4 1 Gutmann's discussion of the division
of authority between state and federal governments might have benefited
from some historical, political, or legal analysis of federalism principles.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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She also provides little detail on how to implement her general
suggestions.
Her approach does have two major strengths. Although the primary focus of each chapter might suffer from the breadth of the discussion, this very breadth ensures that the reader will be both educated and
entertained. Gutmann's discussion of how much control states should
retain over educational policy contains a gem of a footnote listing some
of the more ridiculous requirements that states currently mandate: "California requires the teaching of 'kindness towards domestic pets'; Wisconsin requires instruction in 'the true and comparative vitamin content
... and health values of dairy products'; Maine requires public schools to
'teach virtue and morality for not less than one-half hour per week.' "42
In analyzing the problems with the teaching profession, she engages in an
extended and interesting discussion of the hazards of too much or too
little control over professional standards resting in the hands of the profession itself. This discussion is relevant to other professions, including,
as she notes, law. Too little autonomy results in "the ossification of office" and too much in "the insolence of office." 43 These discussions, tangential to her primary purpose, do much to compensate for the
occasional lack of depth. The second benefit of her approach is that it
represents an admirable effort-whether or not successful-to place her
theory in context and to solve real-world problems.
The remainder of the book explores different facets of the practical
implications of her democratic theory of education and exhibits similar
strengths and weaknesses. In Chapter four, Gutmann applies the nondiscrimination and nonrepression principles to conclude that even democratic majorities cannot ban books from school libraries arbitrarily or
require the teaching of creationism. Such majorities are free, however, to
select textbooks, to decide whether to require sex education, and to adopt
affirmative action policies in order to break down stereotypes that might
inhibit some children from receiving an adequate education.
Gutmann's treatment of these issues often seems uninformed and
one-dimensional, especially in areas with substantial legal precedent or
scholarship, such as affirmative action and creationism. She reaches an
interesting conclusion regarding gender-based affirmative action in hiring: such action is justified not to guarantee equal employment opportunities for women, but to ensure equal educational opportunities for girls
by providing them with unstereotyped role models."4 Because this ap42. P. 74 n.2.
43. See pp. 76-79.
44. P. 114.
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proach directly contradicts the Supreme Court's approach in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,45 some legal analysis might have been helpful. Gutmann is not legally trained, however, and the book is not specifically directed at a legal audience, so this is a minor quibble.
Sometimes Gutmann's applications seem to be missing elements of
her own theories. Her argument against requiring the teaching of creationism, for example, seems to rest on two bases: that teaching creationism "violates the principl.e of nonrepression in indirectly imposing a
sectarian religious view on all children" 46 and that we cannot agree on
what "knowledge" to transmit to future generations without accepting
scientific standards of verification. 47 Both arguments are rather indirect.
She might instead have suggested that the difference between scientific theories and religious theories is actually the difference between critical deliberation and blind acceptance. While scientific practice often
may be constrained by a nearly blind acceptance of the "truth" of the
reigning paradigm, 48 the goal of science is a search for knowledge. As
such, critical deliberation may be more ideal than real in scientific inquiry, but it is still the ideal: there is no authoritative source of knowledge. For those religious sects that advocate teaching creationism,
however, the ultimate truth is found in a literal interpretation of the Bible. To the extent that neither the authoritativeness nor the interpretation of the Bible's account is questionable, critical inquiry is unnecessary
and perhaps even dangerous. This is, of course, only an account of a
religious ideal, and not all religions even subscribe to this ideal.
Thus, the difference between teaching evolution and teaching creationism is that teaching evolution is (or should be) teaching a still-evolving theory and the tools with which to construct and deconstruct that
theory, while teaching creationism is teaching undisputed and indisputable truth. Teaching creationism directly violates the principle of
nonrepression by inhibiting the development of the capacity to deliberate
45. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). In Wygant, the Court struck down a provision of a collective bargaining agreement that required the Jaikson Board of Education to protect members of certain minority
groups against layoffs. Id. at 270. The district court had upheld the agreement, stating that racial
preferences were permissible under the equal protection clause as an attempt to remedy social discrimination by providing "role models" for minority school children. The Court rejected the role
model theory, stating that the theory would allow the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring and
layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose. Id. at 275. The
Court went further and noted that school boards might actually use the district court's theory to
escape the obligation to remedy such practices by relying on the small percentage of black students
to justify the small percentage of black teachers. Id. at 276.
46. P. 103.
47. P. 102.
48. See T. KUHN, THE STmuCTURE OF SCENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 5 (1962).
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critically and rationally. 49
Like the earlier chapters, however, even the weaker portions of Gutmann's discussion reward a careful reader. She recognizes that affirmative action, by resting important decisions on gender, poses a threat to
the principle of nondiscrimination. Because most elementary school
teachers are women and most school administrators are men, however,
without affirmative action "schools will teach children that 'men rule
women and women rule children.' -50 This unfortunate lesson encourages children to accept stereotypes uncritically and diminishes the educational opportunities of some children. Gutmann thus notes a conflict
51
between the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination.
Although her resolution of the conflict is less than satisfying, 52 her identification of the possibility of conflict raises intriguing questions for law
teachers. One may view the Socratic method as a quintessential attempt
to uphold the principle of nonrepression by teaching rational and critical
reasoning. What then should a Socratic law teacher do when that style
of reasoning is foreign to some students because of their different educational backgrounds, cultures, or "voices" 53 and thus would violate the
principle of nondiscrimination by making it more difficult for those students to learn?
Chapter five discusses the extent to which society should allocate
resources to education rather than to other social goods, how it should
distribute those resources, and how it should distribute children within
49. Cf. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 243-47 (1986) (distinguishing between the "tolerant mind," one prepared to
accept diversity of viewpoints and comfortable with uncertainty and complexity, and the "obedient
mind," one that does not think for itself). Bollinger admits, however, that tolerance may become
obedience, citing obedience to and tolerance of a monarch by his subjects. Id. at 246. The tolerant
mind, however, unlike the obedient mind, remains free to consider the possibility of disobedience.
Id. at 247.
50. P. 113 (quoting L. POGREBIN, GROWING Up FREE: RAISING YOUR CHILDREN IN THE
80's, at 491 (1980)).
51. See p. 114.
52. Gutmann proposes "to admit gender as a qualification for administration and teaching until
there are enough men and women in both positions to break down their sex stereotyping." Id. She
does not explain how this solution avoids violation of the nondiscrimination principle. A more
complex analysis would take account of the interaction between the nondiscrimination principle and
preexisting inequalities. See generally Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV.
10, 54-57 (1987) (noting how the presumption that existing societal arrangements are "natural and
desirable" is deeply entrenched and influences courts in subtle and complex ways).
53. See generally C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (exploring the difference between men's and women's moral
"voices"); Excluded Voices: Realities in Law and Reform, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1987) (symposium focusing on how some viewpoints are excluded from lawmaking); Colloquy: Human Voice in
Legal Discourse, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 577 (1988) (discussing the absence of "human voice" in legal
education); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543 (1986) (noting that women's jurisprudential "voices" may be different from men's).
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school systems. Again, Gutmann's theoretical discussion is more satisfying than her practical application of it. She rejects currently popular
arguments that educational opportunity should be maximized, equalized,
or based solely on intelleci:ual ability or motivation. 54 Instead, a democratic theory of education requires a democratic determination of the relative allocation of funds between education and other goods, even if such
a distribution fails to maximize educational opportunity. Distribution
within schools, however, i3 subject to a restraint similar to nondiscrimination: inequalities are justified only if the worst-off students still receive
an education adequate to participate in the political process as adults.
Beyond that minimum, democratic communities may decide for themselves how to allocate resources.
The practical usefulness of this precise scheme is compromised by
Gutmann's fuzzy definition of an education adequate for republican citizenship. Such an education would require high school graduates "to
have the intellectual skills and the information that enable them to think
about democratic politics and to develop their deliberative skills and
their knowledge through practical experience. ' 5 5 Her own application of
this definition, moreover, suggests the utopian nature of many of her
practical suggestions: she says that redefining functional literacy from
the standpoint of a democratic theory of education leads to a redirection
of concern "away from the question of whether high school graduates
can get good jobs and toward the question of whether they have the ca'5 6
pacity to deliberate about the political issues that affect their lives."
The chapter on distribution of educational resources does contain a
nice discussion of integration and judicially mandated busing. Gutmann
presents one of the more :persuasive arguments in favor of busing, avoiding some of the extremes on both sides. She suggests that de facto segregation, like de jure segregation, perpetuates racial stereotypes and thus
violates the principle of nondiscrimination, 57 that parental opposition to
busing is so entrenched that legislators cannot safely advocate it,58 and
54. See p. 136.
55. P. 147.
56. P. 148. Part of the utopian nature of Gutmann's suggestions lies in the necessarily limited
focus of the book itself. Societal problems, including the failure of republican citizenship, cannot be
traced solely to education, nor can they be cured by changes in educational policy. Gutmann notes
that "states must provide access to a wide range of other goods and services--decent housing, job
training and employment for parcnts, family counselling, day care and after-school programs for
children-without which schools cannot possibly succeed in their educational missions." P. 151.
Gutmann argues further that the "aims of democratic education will not be fully realized until
citizens have additional opportunities to exercise discretion in their daily work and to participate in
democratic politics." P. 282.

57. See p. 162.
58. See p. 165.
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that parents whose children have been bused actually fmd busing a positive experience. 59 She thus argues that "[o]ne can begin to construct a
tentative case for judicial enforcement of desegregation upon its democratic rationale, the educability of public opinion concerning desegrega6
tion, and the electoral obstacles to its implementation."
The last four chapters explore more specialized questions farther
afield from the primary focus of the book. Gutmann discusses the purposes of higher education in Chapter six, the distribution of higher education in Chapter seven, and extramural and adult education in Chapters
eight and nine respectively. Perhaps because these questions are peripheral to the central issues of the book and raise rather unique problems,
Gutmann's treatment of them is particularly unsatisfying. Each pair of
chapters might serve as the focus for another entire book, and the limited
discussion of these subjects in DemocraticEducation inevitably seems superficial and problematic.
Again, however, each chapter contains sufficient insights and useful
tangents beyond its central theme to justify a careful reading. Gutmann's discussion of the purposes of higher education contains an excellent refutation of Allan Bloom's vision of universities as elite ivory
towers. 61 Her chapter on distributing higher education provides a good
justification of the secondary result reached in Regents of the University
of Californiav. Bakke. 62 She argues persuasively that it is absurd to suppose that academic ability is a sufficient qualification for any professional
career, and thus academic ability is only one of many characteristics (including, in some instances, race or gender) relevant to distributing higher
education. 6 3 In Chapter nine, Gutmann disputes Rawls's conclusion that
government should not subsidize culture; 64 in the process she shows how
the abstractness of A Theory of Justice detracts from its usefulness in the
65
real world.
59. See pp. 165-66.
60. P. 167.
61.

See pp. 185-93. See generally A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1987).

For an equally good refutation that takes a different approach, see Nussbaum, Book Review, N.Y.
REv. OF BOOKS, Nov. 5, 1987, at 22.
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In Bakke, the Court invalidated the University of California Medical
School's admission program that set a fixed numerical quota of places reserved for economically or
educationally disadvantaged applicants and members of minority groups. Id. at 274-75. The Court,
however, upheld the broader practice of taking race into account in admissions decisions. Id. at 272.
63. See pp. 198-99. Even here Gutmann avoids drawing absolute conclusions. She states that it
is "almost" as absurd to rely solely on academic ability as it is to rely solely on good character:
"Almost, I say, because a few professional careers, in theoretical mathematics for example, require
almost exclusively intellectual ability." P. 199 n.14.
64. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTICE 283 (1971).

65. See p. 262.
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Evaluated solely as a philosophical work about American educational policy, Democratic Education is an interesting, informative, and
persuasive book. For that reason alone, most educators (including legal
academics) should read it. It is also much more. As an integration of
democratic principles and republican citizenship, the book has much to
teach those of us who struggle with these problems in the field of constitutional law and jurisprudence.
III.
What can constitutional scholars learn from DemocraticEducation?
First, Gutmann addresses a central problem of modem constitutional jurisprudence in general: reconciling majoritarianism with limits on majority rule. 66 Recall her description of the democratic ideal: "a society
whose adult members are, and continue to be, equipped by their education and authorized by political structures to share in ruling. ' 67 From
this ideal she derives both the principle of majority rule and the constraints on its exercise.
Her theory of democracy thus mirrors much of contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, insofar as it contemplates the existence of prin68
cipled limits on outcomes against a background of majoritarianism.
Constitutional scholars have long struggled-largely without success-to
define substantive constraints on majoritarianism. 69 None of these attempts has produced anything resembling a consensus. What Gutmann
contributes to the struggle is a way of deriving the substantive constraints
from the purposes of democracy itself, while at the same time focusing on
both the individual citizen and the polity. Earlier attempts to identify
democracy with political participation 7° often have failed to recognize
that citizenship means more than the unconstrained opportunity to vote
or to debate public issues. Gutmann's focus on education-and thus on
66. See pp. xi, 121, 177. For two different views on why this might not be the appropriate focus
of constitutional jurisprudence, seB Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. - (forthcoming 1988), and Sherry, Issue Manipulationby the Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 612-14 (1986).
67. P. xi.
68. See, eg., Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1117
(1977) ("Although it is natural to emphasize the great power that majorities are given in democratic
government-for this obviously distinguishes such a government from monarchy or oligarchy-it is
critical to recognize that they are riot given all power."); Sager, Rights Skepticism and Process-Based
Responses, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 417, 441-45 (1981) (noting a systematic tension between a commitment to majority rule and a commitment to individual rights).
69. Perhaps the best-known example of such an attempt is John Ely's DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
70. See, e.g., A. MEIKLEJOEN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1960).
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preparation for citizenship-allows her to consider more carefully the
conditions under which political participation becomes more than a formal structure of rules. Her analysis also might be useful as a way of
71
defending or discussing such cases as Brown v. Board of Education, Plyler v. Doe,72 and Wisconsin v. Yoder; 73 each reflects a vision of what it
means to be educated as a citizen of a democracy.
More importantly, DemocraticEducation offers a republican vision
of democracy. Recently, a number of constitutional scholars have sug-

gested that both our history and our constitutional jurisprudence encompass more than uncomplicated individual liberty. Following the lead of
historians 74 and philosophers, 75 these constitutional scholars are attempting to transform the prevailing liberal individualist paradigm by recapturing a virtue-based republicanism. 76 I say "recapturing" because
virtually all contemporary neorepublicans weave into their theories a
claim, that we have deviated from our republican heritage. Whether or
not their claim of departure from our heritage is true, neorepublicans
face serious problems in persuading a modem liberal state that the republican paradigm should prevail.
The republican paradigm, in its simplest form, contemplates a state
in which the community deliberatively chooses a nonneutral vision of the
71. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In prohibiting segregation in public education, the Court stressed the
importance of education in a democratic society. Id. at 493. Education, the Court noted, is required
in the performance of the most basic public responsibilities and is the foundation of good citizenship.
Id.
72. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In holding that a state could not deny aliens access to public education, the Court recognized that public schools are a most vital civic institution for the preservation of
a democratic system of government. Id. at 221. The Court added that some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in an open political system.
Id.
73. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In holding that Amish parents could decline to send their children to
public or private school after they had completed eighth grade, which was in violation of a state's
compulsory school attendance law for children up to 16 years of age, the Court recognized that
despite the need for education, it could not impinge on other fundamental rights and interests protected by the Constitution, in this case the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Id.
at 213-14. The majority opinion did not discuss whether such a religiously motivated parental
choice would deprive Amish children of an adequate education.
74. During the last two decades, many historians have suggested that eighteenth century Americans were influenced by classical republican ideals as well as by the liberalism of John Locke. See,
e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967); G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the

Right to Propertyin Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467 (1976).
75. See, eg., A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (1981) (arguing
that our society has largely if not entirely lost its practical and theoretical comprehension of

morality).
76. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (describing republicanism as a counter-ideology to the prevailing scheme);
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (challenging the
influence of factions and interest groups, which can distort the lawmaking process and undermine
original constitutional goals).
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good life, a vision that then supports and is supported by a virtuous citizenry. 77 The obvious danger of such a republican vision is its tendency
to shade into totalitarianism. Moreover, many modem republicans have
engaged in a utopian tendency toward overvaluing the interest of the
community at the expense of the individual.7 8 This particular tendency
creates two problems for the new republicans. First, it distorts the historical record, as eighteenth century republicans were also strong advocates of natural rights. 79 More importantly, such a tendency guarantees
the failure of neorepublican theories in a society that still treasures individual rights: "Theorizing; a comfortable place for individual legal rights
within a republican constitutional vision is a task that has never been
completed. No republican revival in American constitutional law is
'8 0
likely to last very long without major progress in that task."
DemocraticEducation offers a way out of this dilemma. While Gutmann's citizens are clearly republican, her polity is democratic. "Like
the family state, a democratic state of education tries to teach virtuenot the virtue of the family state (power based upon knowledge), but
what might best be called democratic virtue: the ability to deliberate, and
hence to participate in conscious social reproduction." 8 ' The central virtue in a democratic republican state thus derives from democracy itself.
I have argued elsewhere that the best way to reconcile the contemporary
conflict between the historical visions of republicanism and natural rights
is to label participation in the republican project of defining community
aspirations and values a natural right of citizens. 8 2 Gutmann's thesis improves on this suggestion by linking both civic virtue and individual
rights to an even more fundamental principle-democracy. She thus
makes a jurisprudential virtue out of a historiographic necessity.
77. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 76, at 4 (asserting that republican politics involve not the
pursuit of self-interest, but the selection of the values that ought to control public and private life);
Sherry, supra note 53, at 551 (noting that republicanism finds the primary purpose of government to
be the definition of community values and creation of the public and private virtue for societal
achievement of those values); Suns tein, supra note 76, at 39 (noting that under republicanism, civic
virtue of the citizenry and of its representatives would work as a safeguard against factional
tyranny).
78. I include myself in this group in my earlier writings on republicanism. See Sherry, supra
note 53, at 552. But see Sherry, The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution: A Lawyer's Guide to
ContemporaryHistoricalScholarship, 5 CoNsT. COMM. - (forthcoming 1988). I am grateful to the
participants in the November 1987 "After the Bicentennial" Conference at the Georgetown University Law Center for showing me some of the problems with such a skewed vision of republicanism.
79. See Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1127 (1987).
80. Michelman, supra note 77, at 43 n.229.
81. P. 46.
82. See Sherry, A PragmatistApproach to Natural Rights and Republican Citizenship, in After
the Bicentennial: Essays on the Constitution in its Third Century (M. Tushnet ed.) (unpublished
collection) [hereinafter After the Bicentennial].
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The book's focus on education, moreover, provides perhaps the best
hope of solving the central practical problem with neorepublicanism.
Either because humans are naturally egoistic rather than virtuous, 83 or
because the legacy of two hundred years of individualism is the exaltation of the selfish over the altruistic,84 Americans do not appear suited
for republican citizenship. An apathetic and ill-prepared citizenry barely
exercises its right to vote and devotes more time and enthusiasm to
watching televised sports than to watching televised election returns.
85
Politics is left to politicians and self-interest generally prevails.
As Gutmann recognizes, the best remedy for these failings is education-both education of children by adults and education of adults by
one another. DemocraticEducation defends and describes education for
citizenship.
We must now begin carrying the task forward, sketching structures,
both educational and jurisprudential, which will ensure that internalization of uniquely American values does not become mindless emulation of
the past, and that development of critical faculties does not lead merely
to change for its own sake. We must differentiate between an education
for citizenship and the rights of citizenship, because giving either too
many or too few rights to children or their parents might interfere with
their ability to receive an education adequate to citizenship. Finally, we
must further explore the relationship between the larger polity and the
many subcommunities within it, as well as the relationships among those
8 6
subcommunities.
As Gutmann notes, the importance of pluralism is that "social diversity enriches our lives by expanding our understanding of differing
ways of life."' 87 Learning to tolerate and understand other ways of life is
not merely the necessary price of living in a pluralist society, but is a way
of enriching our own lives. For a truly republican citizen, participation
in the life of the community (or communities) and "the cultivation and
improvement of the human mind"8 8 need not be mutually exclusive ac83. See J. SHKLAR, MEN AND CITIZENS: A STUDY OF ROUSSEAU'S SOCIAL THEORY 18

(1969).
84. See Diamond, Ethics and Politics." The American Way, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 75, 95 (R. Horwitz 3d ed. 1986).

85. On the problem of republican citizenship generally, see Tushnet, The Problem ofRepublican Citizenship, in After the Bicentennial, supra note 82. On some of the causes of nonparticipation,
including both structural obstacles and an apathetic population, see F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, WHY
AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 97-99, 119 (1988).

86. See Minow, Groups and the Constitution, in After the Bicentennial, supra note 82.
87. P. 33.
88. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 287 (A.
Koch ed. 1966) (C. Tansill 1927) (citing remarks of James Wilson on July 13, 1787).
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tivities. Democratic Education should inspire further efforts to defme
and to encourage republican citizenship.
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